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Selling short can be expensive.  In order to sell short, one must borrow the stock from a 
current owner, and this stock lender may charge a fee to the short seller.  The fee is determined 
by supply and demand for the stock in the stock loan market.  In addition to these direct costs, 
there are other costs and risks associated with shorting, such as the risk that the short position 
will have to be involuntarily closed at a loss due to recall of the stock loan.  Finally, legal and 
institutional constraints inhibit or prevent investors from selling short.  In financial economics, 
these impediments and costs are collectively referred to as “short sale constraints”. 
The presence of short sale constraints means that stocks may become overpriced. 
Consider a stock whose fundamental value is $100 (i.e., $100 would be the share price in a 
frictionless world).  If it costs $1 to short the stock, then arbitrageurs cannot prevent the stock 
from rising to $101.  If the $1 is a holding cost that must be paid every day that the short position 
is held, then selling the stock short becomes a gamble that the stock falls by at least $1 a day.  In 
such a market, a stock could be very overpriced, yet if there is no way for arbitrageurs to earn 
excess returns, the market is still in some sense efficient.  Fama (1991) describes an efficient 
market as one in which “deviations from the extreme version of the efficiency hypothesis are 
within information and trading costs.”  If frictions are large, “efficient” prices may be far from 
frictionless prices. 
In this paper, we explore overpricing and market efficiency using new, direct evidence on 
the cost of shorting.  Specifically, we introduce a unique dataset that details shorting costs for 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1926-1933.  In this period, the cost of shorting 
certain NYSE stocks was set in the “loan crowd”, a centralized stock loan market on the floor of 
the NYSE.  A list of loan crowd stocks and their associated loaning rates was printed daily in the 
 1 Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 
From this public record, we have collected eight years of data on an average of 80 
actively traded stocks, by far the most extensive panel dataset on the cost of shorting ever 
assembled.  There is substantial variation in the cost of shorting, both in the cross-section and 
over time for individual stocks.  Furthermore, new stocks periodically appear in the loan crowd, 
and we are able to track the behavior of these stocks both before and after they first appear on the 
list.  A stock appears on the list when shorting demand cannot be met by normal channels, and 
when stocks begin trading in the centralized borrowing market, they usually have high shorting 
costs.  Thus the list conveys important information about shorting demand.  
This paper makes two contributions.  First, we characterize the cost of borrowing 
securities during this period, and are able to say which of the patterns observed circa 2000 are 
repeated in our sample, thus broadening the facts presented in D’Avolio (2001) and Geczy et al 
(2001).  For example, as in current markets, most large-cap stocks can be shorted fairly 
inexpensively, but sometimes even large-cap stocks become temporarily expensive to short.   
Small stocks tend to be more expensive to short, but only during the first half of the sample.  We 
also quantify the extent to which the value effect is explainable by shorting costs. 
Second, and most importantly, we show that stocks that are expensive to short have low 
subsequent returns, consistent with the hypothesis that they are overpriced.  Stocks that newly 
enter the borrowing market exhibit especially substantial overpricing.  Prices rise prior to 
entering the loan list, peak immediately before a stock enters the loan list, and subsequently fall 
as the apparent overpricing is corrected.   
By itself, this return predictability is important because it shows that transactions costs 
keep arbitrageurs from forcing down the prices of overvalued stocks.  However, we also find that 
 2 loan crowd entrants underperform by more than the costs of shorting, so it appears that shorting 
these stocks is a profitable strategy even after paying the associated costs.  Thus not only are 
these stocks overpriced, they are more overpriced than can be explained by measured shorting 
costs alone.  It must be that unwillingness to short (or some other unobserved shorting cost) is 
partially responsible for the low returns on stocks entering the loan crowd for the first time.  
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the basic hypothesis and 
review the literature.  In Section 3 we discuss the institutions and history of short selling.  In 
Section 4 we describe how we build the sample and show its main characteristics.  Section 5 
shows that stocks that are expensive to short and stocks that enter the loan crowd for the first 
time have high prices and low subsequent returns.  Section 6 summarizes and presents 
conclusions.   
2.  Theory and existing evidence 
2.1.  Shorting costs and overpricing 
Short sale constraints can prevent negative information or opinions from being expressed 
in stock prices, as in Miller (1977).  Although shorting costs are necessary in order for 
mispricing to occur, they are not sufficient.  Shorting costs can explain why a rational arbitrageur 
fails to short the overpriced security, but not why anyone buys the overpriced security.  To 
explain that, one needs investors who are willing to buy overpriced stocks.  Thus two things, 
trading costs and some investors with downward sloping demand curves, are necessary for 
substantial mispricing. 
The Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model illustrates this point nicely.  In their noisy 
rational expectations model, short sale constraints impede the transmission of private 
information, but no stock is overpriced conditional on public information.  Rational uninformed 
 3 agents take the constraints into account, and prices are unbiased because there is common 
knowledge that negative opinion may not be reflected in order flow. 
When shorting a stock, the short seller pays a fee to someone who owns shares.  Thus one 
investor’s cost is another investor’s income.  For example, suppose a stock is currently 
overpriced at $101 and will fall to $100 tomorrow.  Suppose that in order to short one share, the 
short seller must pay the lender (the owner of the stock) a fee of $1.  In this example, both the 
owner and the short seller are breaking even.  However, high shorting costs predict low 
subsequent returns, where returns are calculated in the traditional way (that is, ignoring income 
from stock lending).  We call this stock “overpriced” at $101, although both the owner and the 
lender are at equilibrium.
1  However, an important equilibrium condition is that not all shares can 
be lent out. Somebody must ultimately own the shares and not lend them, so some type of 
investor heterogeneity is necessary to support this equilibrium.  A specific type of heterogeneity 
is that the owning investors are simply uninformed or irrational.  For example, Lamont and 
Thaler (2001) examine a small number of technology IPO’s that they argue are clearly 
overpriced relative to parent stocks, have high shorting costs, and are probably the result of 
errors made by investors.   
To the best of our knowledge, we have assembled the first sample of shorting costs that 
covers a long period of time, so ours is the first paper that can look at cross-sectional return 
differences with any sort of power.  D’Avolio (2001), Geczy et al. (2001), Mitchell et al. (2001), 
Ofek and Richardson (2001), and Reed (2001) all have data covering a year or less around the 
year 2000.   
Because most other researchers have not had direct evidence on the cost of shorting, they 
have instead used indirect measures of shorting costs.  One measure is the existence of exchange-
 4 traded options.  Options can facilitate shorting, because options can be a cheaper way of 
obtaining a short position and allow short-sale constrained investors to trade with other investors 
who have better access to shorting.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) show that optionable stocks 
have higher short interest.  Sorescu (2000) finds that in the period 1981 – 1995, the introduction 
of options for a specific stock causes its price to fall, consistent with the idea that options allow 
negative information to become impounded into the stock price. 
2.2. Shorting  demand 
Instead of looking at shorting costs, an alternative approach is to look at proxies for 
shorting demand.  If short sellers are better informed or more rational than other investors, their 
trades reveal mispricing.  It could be that unwillingness to short, as opposed to shorting costs or 
inability to short, limits the ability of short sellers to drive prices down to the correct levels.   
There are many potential short sale constraints.  First, institutional or cultural biases 
might prevent shorting.  For example, Almazan et al. (2000) find that only about thirty percent of 
mutual funds are allowed to sell short, and only two percent actually do sell short.  Second, for 
non-centralized shorting markets one must find a stock lender.  This search may be costly and 
time-consuming.  Third, as discussed in Liu and Longstaff (2000) and Mitchell, Pulvino, and 
Stafford (2001), short sellers are required to post additional collateral if the price of the shorted 
stock rises.  If they run out of capital, they will need to close their position at a loss.  Fourth, 
stock loans are usually not term loans, giving rise to recall risk or “buy-in” risk.  The lender of 
the stock has the right to demand the return of his shares at any time.  If the stock lender decides 
to sell his shares (or for some other reason calls in his loan) after the shares have risen in price, 
the short sellers may be forced to close their position at a loss if they are unable to find other 
shares to borrow. 
 5 One measure of shorting demand is short interest, that is, the level of shares sold short.  
Figlewski (1981), Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Dechow et al. (2001) show that stocks with 
high short interest have low subsequent returns.  Unfortunately, using short interest as a proxy 
for shorting demand is problematic, because the quantity of shorting represents the intersection 
of supply and demand.  Demand for shorting should respond to both the cost and benefit of 
shorting the stock, so that stocks that are very costly to short will have low short interest.  Stocks 
that are impossible to short have an infinite shorting cost, yet the level of short interest is zero.  
Lamont and Thaler (2001), for example, examine a sample of technology carve-outs that appear 
to be overpriced.  In their sample, the apparent overpricing and the implied cost of shorting fall 
over time, while the level of short interest rises.  Thus short interest can be negatively correlated 
with shorting demand, overpricing, and shorting costs.  The problematic nature of short interest 
has lead to weak empirical results.  Figlewski and Webb (1993), for example, find that the short 
interest predicts stock returns in the 1973-1979 period but not in the 1979-1983 period. 
An alternative measure of shorting demand is breadth of ownership.  If short sale 
constraints prevent investors from shorting overpriced securities, then all they can do is avoid 
owning overpriced stocks.  With dispersed private information or differences of opinion, 
overpriced stocks will tend to be owned by a few optimistic owners.  Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2001) find evidence in favor of this hypothesis.   
3.  Institutional and historical background 
The mechanics and institutional details of short sales in US equity markets have changed 
little in the past century.  Unlike the Treasury market and the derivatives markets, the equity 
shorting market has actually regressed in some respects.  In this section, we describe the process 
of selling short, comparing the evidence circa 2000 and the evidence from our sample period of 
 6 1926-1933. 
3.1.  The market for borrowing stock 
Borrowing shares in order to sell short can be complex.  If the investor’s broker has other 
margin accounts that are long the stock (or owns the stock himself), the broker accomplishes the 
loan via internal bookkeeping.  Otherwise, the investor’s broker needs to find an institution or 
individual willing to lend the shares.  Circa 2000, brokers, mutual funds, trusts, and other 
institutions do much of this lending.  Circa 2000, it can be difficult or impossible to find a 
willing lender for some equities, especially illiquid small-cap stocks with low institutional 
ownership. 
Suppose A lends shares to B and B sells short the stock.  When the sale is made, the short 
sale proceeds do not go to B but rather to A.  The actual term of the loan is one day, though the 
loans can be renewed in subsequent days.  Because A is effectively using collateral to borrow, A 
must pay interest to B.  When the loan is closed, A repays cash to B and B returns the shares to 
A.  Although sometimes various terms of this transaction (such as the amount of collateral 
provided) are negotiated between the two parties, in most cases the interest rate received by B is 
the only important variable.  This one-day rate, called the “loan rate” or “loaning rate” during our 
sample and the “rebate rate” now, serves to equilibrate supply and demand in the stock lending 
market.
2  The rate can be different across stocks and changes from day to day. 
Stocks that are cheap to borrow have a high rebate rate.  Circa 2000, most large cap 
stocks are both cheap to borrow (the rebate rate is high) and easy to borrow (one can find a stock 
lender).  D’Avolio (2001) and Reed (2001) report that most stocks in their sample are cheap to 
borrow, and they trade at the general collateral rate, a rate that tracks overnight Fed Funds and 
other very short-term rates quite closely.  For these stocks, the cost of shorting, which is the 
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15 basis points per year.  Similarly, during the 1920’s, most large stocks had a loan rate at or 
near the broker’s call money rate (as we describe later, this relation broke down in the 1930’s).    
Stocks that are expensive to borrow have a low or possibly negative rebate rate.  In 
modern lingo, stocks with low or negative rebates are “hot” or “on special.” A negative rate 
means that the institution that borrows shares must make a daily payment to the lender for the 
right to borrow (instead of receiving interest on the cash collateral posted with the lender).  In 
our sample, rebate rates of zero are called “flat” and negative rebate rates are “premiums.” 
Finally, this discussion applies mainly to institutions.  Individuals who short (through 
their brokers) typically receive a rebate rate of zero, both in modern times and in the 1920’s 
(Huebner (1922) p. 169), with the broker keeping any rebate (unless the stock is loaning at a 
premium, in which case the individual pays).  Further, individual investors who hold stocks in 
margin accounts typically do not receive any benefit when their stock is lent out either circa 2000 
or in our sample (p. 91 Meeker (1932)).  In this paper we treat returns from the perspective of a 
broker trading for himself. 
In modern data, short selling is relatively rare and the amount of shares sold short is 
small.  Our sample is similar.  Meeker (1932) reports that total short interest as a percent of total 
NYSE shares outstanding was less than one percent, 1929-1931, and on November 12, 1929, 
short interest was 0.15 percent of all shares and 0.12 percent of market capitalization.  Similarly, 
Figlewski and Webb (1993) report average short interest as a percent of shares outstanding of 0.2 
percent for the 1973-1983 period.  As of January 1, 1929, Meeker (1932) reports out of 1,287 
NYSE stocks, with an average market equity of $55 million, only 33 had short interest greater 
than $0.5 million.  Similarly, Dechow et al (2001) report that less than two percent of all stocks 
 8 have short interest of greater than five percent, 1976-1993. 
3.2.  The loan crowd 
In our sample period of 1926-1933, stock lending was done for some stocks through a 
centralized market on the floor of the NYSE.  A “loan crowd” met regularly throughout the 
trading day on the NYSE floor at the “loan post” in order to facilitate borrowing and lending of 
shares between members.  This market was most active just after the 3:00 p.m. close, as brokers 
assessed their net borrowing needs at the end of the day’s trading.  The result of this centralized 
lending market was a market-clearing overnight loan rate on each security, which was reported 
in the next day’s WSJ.   
Table 1 shows two days of stock loan rates, for the last trading day of January 1926 and 
February 1926.  Consider first the data for January.  Many of the included stocks, e.g. U.S. Steel, 
are the largest and most liquid stocks of the time.  Next to each stock is printed the loan or rebate 
rate.  The example displays the typical features of the data.  Most stocks have a loan rate of 4.5 
or 5.5 percent, while a handful have rates of zero.  For comparison, the call money rate for the 
previous day was 5 percent, so most stocks are being lent near the call money rate.
3  The data for 
January shows no stocks trading at a premium (a negative rebate) and a large mass of stocks at a 
rate of exactly zero, an unlikely event if rates were continuously distributed in response to supply 
and demand. 
This centralized market for borrowing NYSE stocks no longer exists.  Instead, circa 2000 
stock lending is done via individual deals struck between institutions and brokers.  This lack of a 
central market is why existing studies of the cost of shorting have only a year of data or less from 
proprietary sources.   In this sense, the shorting market has regressed since our sample period, 
since rebate rates are no longer centrally determined and publicly observable. 
 9 On balance, however, except for regulation, the fact that the stock lending market is no 
longer centralized does not necessarily mean the cost of shorting is significantly higher today 
than in the 1920’s.  Most NYSE stocks did not trade at the loan post.  Table 1 lists 59 stocks for 
February 1926, while CRSP lists 518 NYSE stocks for the same date, so only 11 percent of 
existing stocks got into our sample in that month.  Further, of the 59 stocks on the list, probably 
most borrowing never went through the loan post but rather occurred internally within brokers.   
3.3.  The sources of cross-sectional variation in rebate rates 
Rebate rates reflect supply and demand of shares to lend.  Stocks go on special when 
shorting demand is large relative to the supply of shares available for lending.  Thus, specific 
stocks can be costly to short either because there is a large demand or a small supply.  No matter 
what the reason for the high shorting costs, however, the consequences of the costs are clear.  
Stocks that are expensive to short can be overpriced since it is expensive to correct the 
overpricing.  Thus, we do not need to identify the reason for the low rebate rate in order to test 
whether it results in overpricing. 
Demand for borrowing stock can be high, most obviously, because the stock is 
overpriced.  This speculative demand for shorting is the motivation for studies that try to predict 
stock returns with short interest.  In addition, investors also short for hedging needs.  The SEC 
estimated that in 1937 38% of all short sales were for some hedging purpose (Leffler (1951) p. 
302). Contemporary accounts for our sample period describe the familiar arbitrage activity of 
buying one security and shorting another, with trades involving preferred stock, convertible 
bonds, rights issues, and so on.  Unlike modern sample periods with exchange-traded derivatives, 
shorting individual stocks appears to have been the main way for investors to hedge market risk.  
In our sample, shorting was also an important tool for technical purposes such as hedging dealer 
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share certificates were physically distant from the NYSE. 
Stocks can also be costly to short if their lendable supply is low.  In general, small and 
illiquid stocks are difficult to short for the same reason that they are difficult to buy: it is hard to 
find trading partners.  More specifically, both circa 2000 and in our sample period, loanable 
supply consists of shares owned by financial institutions (such as mutual funds) and shares held 
by retail investors in margin accounts at stockbrokers.  Accounts of the process circa 2000 stress 
institutional ownership as the determining factor (D’Avolio (2001)).  Accounts in our sample 
stress the importance of stocks held on margin, driven by the holdings of “speculators,” 
including individuals buying on margin and brokers themselves, as opposed to holdings for the 
purposes of “investment” (non-margin accounts of long-term investors) and “control” (such as 
holdings by insiders or other stocks).  Supply varied across stocks and across time for the same 
stock as the amount held in margin accounts. 
In understanding the determinants of the rebate, it is useful to examine an extreme outlier 
in our sample.  Wheeling & Lake Erie Railroad on the last trading day of January 1927 had a 
rebate rate of -290 percent, representing a daily fee of fifty cents per share for maintaining a 
short position on a stock trading at $62.125.  At this time most stocks were lent at (and the call 
money rate was) four percent, so to borrow this stock one had to sacrifice a 294 percent 
annualized return.  At one point during February 1927 this daily fee rose to an amazing $7 per 
day. 
The premium arose in January and February 1927 because of a confluence of factors 
described in Meeker (1932).  First, in January there was substantial speculation that Wheeling 
would be acquired.  As it turns out, this speculation was correct.  Three other firms together 
 11 bought shares and acquired a 50 percent stake in Wheeling, and the price rose in January from 
$27 to $60.  As these firms bought common shares, the amount of Wheeling common stock 
available for lending fell.  In addition, Wheeling had preferred shares convertible into common 
stock. Unfortunately, Wheeling had failed to obtain the necessary regulatory authorization from 
the NYSE and the Interstate Commerce Commission to issue additional common stock.  Thus 
when holders of preferred shares attempted to convert their shares, their attempt was refused.    
Had these preferred shares been converted, the supply of common would have risen.   
In addition to low lendable supply, shorting demand for Wheeling during this period was 
probably high.  There was both takeover speculation and arbitrageurs who were long Wheeling 
convertible preferred and short the common.  During the period January 27 to February 9, 
Wheeling common stock had extremely volatile prices, low volume, and high shorting costs, all 
driven by extensive shorting demand intersected with the very low supply of lendable shares.  On 
February 9
th, for example, the common stock price ranged from 105 to 66.75.  Thus, it is 
plausible that arbitrageurs would be willing to pay high holding costs to guard themselves 
against the extreme volatility in Wheeling. Last, it is worth noting that the extraordinary cost of 
shorting only lasted two weeks.   
3.4.  Additions to the list as a indicator of shorting demand 
Wheeling had not been listed in the rebate rate list prior to February 1927, and entered at 
high cost.  We show later that new entrants tend to enter at high shorting cost, but Table 1 
demonstrates the general pattern.  Table 1 shows that in February 1926, the list grows 
substantially as more stocks are added.  Unlike the old stocks, which continue to have loan rates 
in much the same pattern as January, these 17 new stocks all have loan rates that are zero or 
negative (we do not classify United Drug as new since it had been in the loan rate list prior to 
 12 January).  The rates are expressed in annual percent terms.  Some of the premium rates are 
extremely high.  For example, Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway loaned at a premium of 
1/16, which means that a borrower would pay the lender 1/16 of a dollar per share per day (an 
annual rate of -67 percent). 
Why did Chicago and Eastern Illinois get added to the list, and why does it have such an 
outlandish cost of shorting?  It must be that (compared to January), in February either the supply 
of lendable shares fell or the demand for lendable shares rose.  According to the WSJ on March 
1, 1926: “Ask any broker who makes it a practice to lend stocks to the shorts and he will tell you 
the demand is heavier than it has been in months.”  It appears that for some reason, shorting 
demand for Chicago and Eastern Illinois, along with the other 16 stocks, increased in February.  
This increase in shorting demand drove the stocks onto the loan post. 
Ultimately, however, it does not matter whether a stock is added to the list because of 
changes in supply or demand.  In either case, the inclusion on the list indicates that there exists 
substantial demand for borrowing the stock to short it.  Contemporary accounts indicate that 
brokers preferred not to go to the loan post if possible.  Leffler (1951) describes (p. 283) the 
algorithm for borrowing stock.  First the broker himself might own it.  If not, his customers 
might own it in a margin account.  If not, other friendly brokers might own it and he would 
contact them directly.  Only after these avenues are exhausted would a broker go to the loan 
crowd.  Meeker (1932) p. 94 says that brokers prefer to settle in house if possible since it saves 
bookkeeping work and because the broker retains the benefits of lending without sharing it with 
another broker. 
In our empirical work, we focus on new entrants to the loan rate list like the 17 stocks 
added at the end of February 1926.  Most loan crowd entrants loan below the general collateral 
 13 rate.  Other stocks loan below the general collateral rate in our sample, for example Western 
Union in Table 1.  However, the fact that Western Union has a high shorting cost may not 
indicate high shorting demand.  Dice (1926) comments on three of the stocks in Table 1:   “That 
a stock is quoted flat may or may not mean that there is a large short interest in the stock.  
Delaware & Hudson, United Fruit, and Western Union have lent flat for some years.  They are 
not regularly loaned at any other rate than on a flat basis, that is, the lender refuses to pay interest 
to the borrower for the money deposited.”   Unfortunately, Dice offers no clues as to why these 
three stocks lend flat for long periods of time. 
Thus, a stock’s first appearance on the loan list is perhaps the best indication that shorting 
demand is high, so high relative to supply that it cannot be met by internal bookkeeping by 
brokers.  This measure of shorting demand is superior to short interest because high short interest 
can indicate high demand or high supply.  For example, US Steel always had very high short 
interest in this period, but this was because it was easy to short and consequently was typically 
used for hedging purposes (in the way modern investors would use S&P futures). 
4. The  sample 
We start by collecting loan rates by hand from the WSJ from December 1919 to October 
1933.  The Journal publishes loan rates on a daily basis; however, since CRSP only has monthly 
data for this period, we collect only loan rates for the last trading day of the month.  CRSP 
returns begin in January 1926.  Thus although we have loan rate data for the pre-CRSP period of 
1919-1925, we do not use this data in our analysis because we do not have prices and returns for 
this period.  We refer to stocks with loan rates in the Journal as “loan crowd stocks.”  For the 
period 1926-1933, we obtain stock prices, returns, dividends, and market equity from CRSP.  We 
also obtain book values from Davis, Fama, and French (2000).
4    
 14 4.1.  Developments in the shorting market in the 1920s and 1930s 
Our sample period of 1926 to 1933 was an eventful time for the US stock market, as the 
nominal level of stock prices first doubled and then dropped to one third of the original level.  
During our sample a major regime shift in the stock loan market occurred in October 1930.  
Figure 1 demonstrates this regime shift, showing that except for March 1933, no stock had a 
positive rebate after October 1930.  The figure shows the fraction of stocks with nonpositive 
(zero or premium) rates and the fraction with premium rates.  For comparison we show the level 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).   
Figure 2 shows month-end call money rates, the highest stock loan rate in the cross-
section for a given month, and the DJIA.  Call money and loan rates track each other closely 
until the regime shift in October 1930, after which loan rates permanently drop well below call 
money rates. 
Figure 3 shows the growth in our sample over time, and again shows the increased 
incidence of negative loan rates after 1930.  Figure 4 shows the DJIA and aggregate short 
interest measured in millions of shares.  The NYSE collected short interest for the one day of 
November 12, 1929, and then collected monthly data starting in May 1931.  Opponents of short 
selling during this period often pointed to the evidence in Figure 4 to claim that short selling 
caused the market to decline, or at least did not appear to cushion market fluctuations. 
Figure 5 shows the value-weighted cost of shorting the portfolio of all loan crowd stocks, 
and compares it to short interest for loan crowd stocks.
5  Here, short interest is measured as total 
short interest for the group divided by the total shares outstanding for the group.  The variable 
COST, used in our empirical work examining monthly returns, is the percent monthly holding 
cost of shorting the stock or alternatively the monthly benefit of owning the stock and lending it 
 15 out.  It is calculated by subtracting the end-of-month rebate rate from the call money rate and 
dividing by twelve, and assumes that this rate difference remains constant over the next month. 
Thus if R is the traditionally calculated monthly return using prices and dividends, R + COST is 
the return from owning and lending, and –R – COST is the return from shorting. 
The evidence in Figure 5 reflects movements in both supply of and demand for borrowed 
shares.  The major movements are consistent with shifts in demand.  Shorting quantity and cost 
are both low in 1929, both high in 1931-1932, and both low again thereafter.  This pattern looks 
like it is tracing out the supply curve for borrowed stock.  However, an identifiable supply shock 
took place in March 1932.  In February 1932 the NYSE announced that as of April 1, 1932 
brokers would require written permission from customers before lending stocks on margin 
(Hoffman (1935)).  The effects of this regulation can be seen in Figure 5 with the huge spike in 
loan rates as of the last trading day of March 1932 and the subsequent decline in short interest.  
When this regulation took effect, the WSJ reported (April 1, 1932, page 1) that shorts “were 
forced to offer stiff premiums to fill their requirements.  Several stocks commanded the highest 
borrowings charges in the history of the Exchange, so far as active trading issues were 
concerned.”  But the supply shock was temporary, as seen in Figure 5. 
Figures 1-5 do not support the notion that high shorting costs allowed the overall market 
to become overpriced prior to the crash of 1929.  To the contrary, the fraction of stocks loaning 
at nonpositive rates steadily declined between 1926 and 1929.  Instead, unwillingness to short (as 
opposed to the cost of shorting) may have played a role.  Unfortunately, although we have better 
price data on stock lending in our sample than in modern samples, we have worse quantity data 
prior to May 1931.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that the volume and amount outstanding of 
short selling declined during the 1920’s.  In a description similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
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prior to the crash “few had the hardihood to sell short” and so “the panic of 1929 descended on 
an inadequate short interest.” 
4.2.  The regime shift in October 1930 and the end of the loan list 
The regime shift in October 1930 was dramatic.  Suddenly, no stock lent at a positive 
rate.  Barron’s (10/20/30) described the “virtually unprecedented spectacle” when US Steel 
loaned at a premium “for the first time in the recollection of the present generation” in October 
1930 as “one of the most excited sessions ever witnessed” at the loan crowd.  As can be seen in 
Figure 2, this regime shift was not caused by a decline in call money rates, which had been 
constant at two percent for the previous three months.  Hoffman (1935) blames the regime shift 
on increased demand for shorting and decreased supply of loanable stocks because “the floating 
supply of stock had also declined, due to the large amount of outright buying” (i.e., fewer shares 
were owned in margin accounts).   
The shift may have been a response to anti-shorting pressure from the US government 
and from popular opinion.  Governments often restrict short selling in an attempt to maintain 
high security prices.  Meeker (1932) reviews the attempts by a colorful cast of characters (from 
Napoleon to the New York state legislature) to ban short selling.  Short selling restrictions 
historically follow major price declines as short sellers are blamed.  For example, special short 
selling regulations were imposed on the NYSE in November 1917 after the market had fallen 31 
percent in the previous 12 months, although these regulations were in part based on fears that the 
Kaiser would send enemy agents to drive down stock prices.   
Consistent with the historical pattern, the stock loan market after 1929 was affected by 
political events.  Short sellers were extremely unpopular in 1930, and many politicians, 
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NYSE tried to rein in the stock loan market in response to pressure from various branches of the 
U.S. government.  The following evidence is from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle of 
October 18, 1930, which quotes the Journal of Commerce for October 16, 1930:  
No let-up in the efforts of Stock Exchange houses to discourage short selling 
rallies through refusing to lend stocks for the purpose was indicated yesterday…word had 
been passed on by the exchange authorities that they desired lending operations to be 
curtailed in order to discourage excessive short selling... 
Brokers said yesterday that they have little objection from the point of view of 
loss of revenue to the calling in of their stocks on loan.  With the prevailing low rate for 
call money, they find that there is but little incentive to lend stocks for the sake of 
securing funds in this way... 
A number of investment trusts reported yesterday that they had been approached 
by brokers who wished to borrow stocks from them at the quoted premiums.  In most 
cases, it is understood, the investment trusts approached did not give any consideration to 
the request, since they felt that their interests were on the side of rising prices and they 
would not do anything which would encourage short selling tactics. 
 
Barron’s (10/20/30), in contrast, dismissed rumors that the NYSE was discouraging lending and 
instead blamed the situation on unwillingness to lend.  It said institutional investors such as 
investment trusts “do not wish to do anything which would encourage short selling…the scarcity 
of stocks for borrowing purposes is considered largely psychological.”  This unwillingness to 
lend (which seems irrational in competitive markets) might be justified by fears of legal 
persecution in a hysterical political environment. 
It is clear that the anti-shorting climate was hysterical in October 1930.  The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle mentions that President Herbert Hoover was meeting with Richard 
Whitney, president of the NYSE, to discuss the situation and curtailing possible bear raids 
implemented via short selling.  The FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover was quoted as saying he would 
investigate the conspiracy to keep stock prices low.  Scroggs (1930) reports in October 1930 that 
the Secretary of Agriculture denounced the short selling of wheat futures by agents of the Soviet 
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Numerous anti-shorting regulations stem from this period, such as the uptick rule and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 which placed severe restrictions on the ability of mutual funds 
to short (see Macey et al. 1989). The NYSE briefly banned short selling for the two-day period 
9/21/31 - 9/23/31 (Whitney and Perkins (1932)).   
We end our sample in July 1933 since there is little cross-sectional variation in loaning 
rates after that date.  In August 1933, the loan rate list is all zeros.  Figure 1 shows this 
uniformity continued for many months (until June 1934) and Figure 2 shows the number of 
stocks listed started to decrease.  The Journal stopped printing the loan rate list in October 1934 
and instead substituted a paragraph noting which stocks, if any, were loaning at a premium.  This 
paragraph continued to be printed until the late 1950’s. 
Perhaps due to anti-shorting pressure or a general decrease in speculative activity, 
shorting activity declined over time.  As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, short interest was 
extremely low in 1933 and thereafter.  Hoffman (1935) provides as explanations the Senate 
investigations of April 1932, closer supervision by the exchange, higher premiums, and a 
“dwindling supply of loanable stocks.”  The loanable supply would dwindle if buy-and-hold 
investors replaced leveraged margin investors, which undoubtedly occurred in the aftermath of 
the 1929 crash. 
The apparent withering of the ability to short during this period is important because it 
helps answer the question posed by Shleifer (2000): “Why do the mechanisms of borrowing 
securities and selling them short appear so underdeveloped?” (p. 195).  Political and legal anti-
shorting pressure, which arises periodically after major market declines, seem essential to 
understanding the nature of the market for shorting. 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of loan rate status in the sample and the characteristics of 
stocks by loan status.  We have a total of 8,310 monthly observations during the 92 month period 
from December 1925 to July 1933.  We have 211 stocks, of which 167 were added to the list 
after December 1925.  Each month we rank all stocks by shorting cost, and create COSTRANK, 
a variable from 0 to 1 reflecting the percentile rank of COST within loan crowd stocks that 
month.    Table 2 shows the characteristics for the top and bottom half sorted by COST, and also 
for premium stocks, stocks with loan rates of exactly zero, and stocks with positive loan rates.
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For the whole sample of 1926-1933, premium stocks are rare, comprising two percent of 
the sample.  Stocks with a nonpositive loan rate are 68 percent of the sample, rising over time as 
reflected in Figure 1.  Compared with modern data, it appears that nonpositive loan rates are 
more common in the 1920’s.  For example, Reed (2000) finds only about six percent of stock 
loans are on “special” or have loan rates below the general collateral rate during 1998-1999, and 
only a few of these have zero or negative rebates. 
Although premiums are rare, when they do occur they can be very large.  We have 487 
observations of premiums for 109 different stocks.  Of these, the median annualized rate is –12 
percent, the mean is –30 percent, and the minimum is –782 percent.  These extreme premiums 
are somewhat higher than observed in modern data.  D’Avolio (2001) reports a maximum 
difference between the rebate and general collateral rate of 82 percent per year, and Reed (2001) 
reports 45 percent. 
The average shorting cost in our sample is 35 basis points per month.  This average cost 
is much higher than that reported in modern data, which D’Avolio (2001) reports is 41 basis 
points per year (equal weighted for all stocks in his database).  Even restricting the sample to 
 20 positive loan rate stocks (which drops all but one month of the 1930-1933 sample), the average 
cost is 12 basis points monthly or 144 basis points annually. 
4.4.  Loan status and other characteristics 
Table 2 also shows the log market equity, log market-book ratios, dividend yields, and 
past returns by loan rate status.  First, it shows that loan crowd stocks are more than twice as big 
as other stocks.  Looking within loan crowd stocks, Table 2 shows that high cost stocks are much 
smaller than low cost stocks and also tend to have lower market-book ratios (a fact that is not 
surprising given that market-book and market value of equity are positively correlated). 
The patterns in Panel A of Table 2 confirm some pieces and contradict other pieces of 
evidence from modern studies using very short sample periods from one data provider.  Geczy et 
al (2001) and D’Avolio (2001) find that stocks with high shorting costs have higher market-
book, contradicting Panel A of Table 2.  Geczy et al (2001) also find that stocks with high 
shorting costs are not smaller than other stocks, although D’Avolio (2001) finds the opposite.  
D’Avolio (2001) finds that stocks with high shorting costs have low past returns, unlike Panel A 
of Table 2. 
Panel B offers an explanation for these contradictions, showing that the correlations of 
shorting cost and other characteristics are not constant over time.  Every correlation switches 
sign between 1926-1930 and 1930-1933.  Most strikingly, the strong negative correlation 
between size and shorting cost that is apparent in the earlier part of the sample disappears later 
on.  These differences highlight the limitations of existing evidence on shorting costs.  The 
characteristics related to shorting costs change over time, so short samples have limited 
applicability. However, it may be that the 1930-1933 period is relatively unusual in US financial 
history, in that bigger stocks were actually more expensive to short.  And of course, like Geczy et 
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for which there is simply no shorting. 
4.5.  How do stocks get on the list and why do they stay on? 
We have no definitive evidence on why stocks are added or removed from the list.  Table 
3 shows transition probabilities.  Loan status is highly persistent.  In the 1926-1930 period when 
positive loan rates were plentiful, stocks with a positive loan rate this month had a 95 percent 
chance of having a positive rate next month.  Especially persistent is having an exactly zero loan 
rate: over the two different regimes, a stock that had always been at zero had a 94 to 96 percent 
chance of having another zero loan rate in the next month.  Stocks are rarely removed from the 
list.  Premium stocks are more likely to be removed (at five percent likelihood over the whole 
sample), but in general the probability of removal is one percent. 
Table 1 shows that new stocks enter at zero or a premium in February 1926.  Table 3 
shows that this pattern is systematic.  Between 1925:12 and 1933:7, 167 stocks enter our list for 
the first time. We classify a stock as entering the list if it had not previously been listed anytime 
since December 1919 (using month end observations).  Of these new entrants, 33% are at 
premium compared with 6% for the whole sample.  Table 2 shows the characteristics of these 
new entrants in their first month on the loan list, and compares their characteristics to incumbent 
stocks on the same date.  New entrants are significantly different from incumbent stocks; they 
are slightly smaller smaller, have market-book ratios that are much higher, and have returns that 
are more than five percent higher in the past year.  Looking at shorting costs, new entrants have 
costs that are more than five times higher per month.  New entrants do not tend to be recent 
IPO’s; they have been in CRSP an average of 45 months before appearing in the loan rate list. 
Additions come in four waves, usually occurring on a single day.  As seen in Figure 3, all 
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to gather pre-CRSP data to study new entrants.  The first wave, already discussed, is in February 
1926, when 17 stocks appear for the first time in the March 1, 1926 WSJ.  Sixteen more stocks 
enter the loan rate list over the next four months.  The second wave occurs in August 1930 with 
33 new stocks appearing for the first time in the Aug 25 1930 WSJ.  The third wave comes in 
between March and May 1932 with 27 stocks entering on various days.  The fourth wave occurs 
in March 1933 with twelve stocks first appearing in the March 20 WSJ.   
The fact that many stocks enter on a single date suggests that factors idiosyncratic to the 
stock are not responsible.  We do not know if these factors involve rising demand for borrowed 
stock or falling supply.  What is clear, however, is that there was particularly high shorting 
demand for these specific stocks relative to other stocks, since these specific stocks were the 
ones added to the loan rate list. 
One regularity is that stocks are seldom removed from the list, even when it appears there 
is little shorting activity in the stock.  An example is a firm called Real Silk Hosiery.  It entered 
the list along with 4 other stocks in February 1927.  It enters at a zero rate, and remains at a zero 
rate until it leaves the list in December 1932.  In June and July of 1931, the NYSE reported zero 
short interest outstanding for Real Silk Hosiery, yet its rate stayed constant at zero.  Our 
suspicion is that zero rate stocks just stay on the list at a zero rate if there are no transactions. 
5.  Scaled prices and subsequent returns 
In this section we examine both scaled prices and subsequent returns.  We start by 
examining scaled prices to see if they rise before a stock becomes expensive to short or enters 
the loan list, and fall thereafter, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis.  We then examine 
return predictability based on loan rate status.  As predicted by the hypothesis that expensive to 
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rates.  Subsequent returns are especially low for new entrants to the loan rate list. 
5.1.  Pattern of market-book ratios 
Table 4 examines monthly market-book ratios for loan crowd stocks.  Column (1) 
regresses the log market-book ratio on COSTRANK, the percentile ranking of shorting COST.  
COSTRANK is zero for the cheapest-to-borrow stocks and one for the costliest-to-borrow 
stocks.  Here as elsewhere in this paper, the regressions include date dummies (a different 
intercept term for each calendar date) and the standard errors have been adjusted for the 
clustering of observations by date. 
Column (1) shows that contrary to the overpricing hypothesis, expensive-to-short stocks 
do not look overpriced.  The lowest cost stock has a log market-book ratio that is 0.49 lower than 
the highest cost stock.  However, as shown in Table 2, size is a potentially confounding factor in 
these regressions, since smaller stocks are harder to short and also tend to have lower market-
book.  Column (2) adds NEWQ1, a dummy variable equal to one in the first quarter of a stocks 
appearance on the loan list (that is, NEWQ1 is one in month t if the firm’s first month on the list 
is month t-2 to month t).  Consistent with the hypothesis that new entrants are overpriced and 
have high shorting demand, new entrants have log market-book ratios that are 0.46 higher than 
incumbents, controlling for shorting cost. 
Column (3) accounts for size by putting log market equity on the right-hand side of the 
regression.  Controlling for size, the highest cost stock has a log market-book ratio that is 0.36 
percent higher than the lowest cost stock, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis.  This result 
highlights the importance of controlling for size in drawing conclusions about overpricing.   
Unaffected by size corrections, however, is the strong effect for newly lent stocks.  Again, new 
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Column (4) through (6) are the most direct test of the overpricing hypothesis.  They 
control for fixed effects by including an individual intercept for each stock (as well as date 
dummies).  Thus they test whether the same stock has a higher market-book ratio when it is 
expensive to short or newly appearing on the loan list, compared to when it is cheaper to short or 
not on the loan list.  The sample for columns (4) through (6) are all observations for stocks that 
are ever loaned in the loan crowd, including stocks that will be in the future (in contrast to 
columns (1) through (3) which only use stocks in the months that they have a rate).  In addition 
to NEWQ1, we add dummies for the three quarters prior to the stock’s entry onto the loan rate 
list (NEWQ(-2) through NEWQ0) and the three quarters after inclusion (NEWQ2 through 
NEWQ4) or thereafter (AFTERQ4).  The dummy variables compare valuation in these periods to 
valuation when the stock was not on the loan list; we set the COSTRANK variable equal to zero 
in non-loan crowd months. 
In terms of the coefficient on COSTRANK, columns (4) through (6) are similar to 
column (3) and show that stocks have higher valuations when they are more costly to short.  
Looking at column (4), again the valuations are significantly related to the cost of shorting; the 
same stock when cheapest to short has a market-book ratio that is about 20 percent lower than 
when most expensive to short. 
Looking at the coefficients on the inclusion dummies in column (4), the time pattern of 
market-book is exactly what is predicted by the overpricing hypothesis.  In the period prior to 
entering the loan rate list, log market-book ratios rise, peaking at 0.32 above average in the 
quarter just before appearance on the loan list.  After appearing on the loan list, market-book 
ratios fall, going down to just 5 percent above average three quarters later.  As shown in columns 
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This pattern suggests stocks that become overpriced over the course of several months, 
are identified as overpriced by short sellers, and the demand for short selling rises.  They appear 
on the loan list due to this demand, and subsequently fall as the mispricing is corrected.  The 
results are consistent with Dechow et al. (2001), who find that short interest rises and falls with 
market-book, and with Geczy et al (2001) who find higher short selling costs for growth stocks.  
In summary, the scaled prices are consistent with the idea that stocks can be overpriced 
when it is difficult to correct the overpricing.  Of course, a major caution is that these 
conclusions are based only on eight years of data, and based on an arbitrary measure of valuation 
that does not control for risk or growth rates.  We next turn to subsequent returns to address these 
issues. 
5.2. Subsequent  returns 
Table 5 shows the relation between loan rate status and the next month’s return.  We start 
by simply regressing month t+1 total return, in percent, on COSTRANK in month t.  Column (1) 
shows that the most expensive to short stocks have returns that are 1.61 percent lower per month 
than the cheapest to short stocks.  The t-statistic is 1.85.   Since we have a one-sided hypothesis 
(that higher cost stocks have lower subsequent returns), it is appropriate to look at one-sided p-
values (for the hypothesis that the coefficient is negative), and we can easily reject the one-sided 
hypothesis. 
Column (2) adds a dummy variable, NEWQ1, for the first quarter of inclusion in the loan 
rates list.  These new entrants have average returns that are 1.94 percent lower per month than 
other loan crowd stocks, controlling for shorting cost, and this effect is statistically strong.  The 
shorting cost variable falls to 1.40 percent, economically large and (marginally) significant for 
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dependent variable by subtracting from raw returns the value weighted returns on the portfolio of 
all non-loan crowd stocks in the same size decile, sorting in month t.
7 We should note, however, 
that size and loan rates are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  For example, it could be that 
small stocks were overpriced in the period 1926-1933, and had both low subsequent returns and 
high shorting costs.  In this scenario, whether size subsumes shorting costs is not necessarily a 
useful question. 
Size-adjusting seriously reduces the magnitude of the cost rank variable and it becomes 
far from significant.  But new entrants have very low returns in the following month.  Column 
(3) is our baseline specification and shows the major finding of this paper.  New entrants, which 
are almost always expensive to short, have low subsequent returns.  Since the loan list is public 
information, this result is inconsistent with rational models such as Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987).  In their simple rational model, once short interest is announced stock prices should 
immediately adjust to take into account the negative information (Aitken et al. (1998) find that 
stock prices fall immediately in response to announced increases in short interest).  Here, 
however, one is able to predict returns one month ahead using public information on shorting 
costs. 
Column (5) shows the dummy variables tracking the entry of the stock onto the loan list.  
As in Table 4, the time pattern of returns matches the overpricing hypothesis.  In the three 
quarters prior to entering the list, returns are (insignificantly) positive.  In the quarter after the 
stock enters the list, its returns are a significantly negative 3.21 percent per month.  In the next 
three quarters, returns continue to be (insignificantly) negative.  Again in column (5) the sample 
is all stocks that were ever in the loan crowd at any time (column (5) does not include stock fixed 
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the robustness of the main results on return predictability.  First, columns (1) and (2) show that 
the baseline results hold in the two different subsamples.  The coefficient on NEWQ1 is also 
robust to a variety of different modifications.
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One implication of frictions is that stock returns can be predictable within arbitrage 
bounds.  Column (3) of Table 6 examines the predictability of stock returns using market-book 
ratios.  Consistent with the well-known value effect, the coefficient on market-book is negative, 
indicating that stocks with high scaled prices have low future returns.  Column (3) tests whether 
this relation is particularly strong for the new entrants, by interacting the NEWQ1 variable with 
log market-book. Expensive-to-short stocks can be especially overpriced so their returns should 
be especially predictable, and as shown previously new loan table entrants have especially high 
valuations.  The results show that as predicted, the coefficient is higher for these new entrants, 
but this difference is not statistically significant. 
Column (3) also shows that with market-book on the right hand side, the coefficient on 
NEWQ1 falls somewhat and is insignificant.  In a related regression, columns (4) adjusts for size 
and market-book by adjusting the left hand side variable.  We split the universe of non-loan 
crowd CRSP stocks into size and market-book terciles and from the intersection of these sorts 
form nine portfolios. From each raw return we subtract the return from a value-weighted 
portfolio consisting of stocks in the same size and market-book tercile.  Like column (3), column 
(4) shows that the coefficient on NEWQ1 shrinks and becomes statistically insignificant.   
Although the NEWQ1 coefficient is still economically large, at first glance this result 
suggests that the loan crowd entrant effect is statistically indistinguishable from the value effect.  
This suggestion is incorrect.  The key fact driving the lower coefficient is not the adjustment for 
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available for the stocks in the regression.  When we replicate our baseline specification (column 
(3) of Table 5) using all the same variables but the smaller sample, we find a coefficient on 
NEWQ1 of -1.72 with a t-statistic of 1.44, so the loss of significance is coming from the smaller 
sample and there is little evidence that our effect reflects market-book ratios.  We later show 
Fama-French (1993) three factor regressions, and find that the value factor does little to explain 
mean returns on new entrants. 
5.3.  Do returns vary one-for-one with shorting costs?  
Table 7 examines whether shorting loan crowd entrant stocks would be profitable after 
accounting for the costs of shorting. We test for the profitability of shorting new entrants by 
adding cost to the left-hand side returns.  Thus the left hand side is R – RSIZE + COST, where R 
is the simple stock return in month t+1, RSIZE is the contemporaneous return from the stock’s 
size decile, and COST is the monthly cost of shorting observed at the end of month t.  The left 
hand side variable could be interpreted either as the return one gets from owning the stock and 
lending it out, or the negative of the return one gets from shorting the security and paying the 
shorting costs in the loaning market.  Since the returns on the left-hand side are size adjusted 
(and we do not observe shorting costs or even ability to short for RSIZE), the assumption is that 
one can short the size decile portfolio at no cost. 
Column (1) shows that cost-adjusted returns for loan crowd entrant stocks are still large 
and negative at 1.85 percent, and one can reject the one-sided hypothesis that the returns are not 
negative (the t-statistic is 1.83).  Columns (2) and (3) show the effect is spread out evenly over 
the two subsamples.  Column (4) puts in shorting costs on the right-hand side rather than 
including them in the dependent variable.  The hypothesis of interest is that the coefficient is –1.  
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of doing so is equal to the benefit, subsequent returns should fall one-for-one with the cost of 
shorting.  An equivalent interpretation is that holders of the stock are willing to accept a lower 
rate of return for owning the stock, in return for the income they reap by lending the stock out to 
short sellers.  Once again, if they buy the stock until the marginal benefit equals the marginal 
cost, the coefficient should be negative one.  Column (5) allows the coefficient on cost to differ 
for premium stocks.  The results show the coefficient is less than negative one.  However, the 
coefficient is never significantly different from zero or from negative one, so no firm conclusion 
emerges.   
Thus the major result from Table 7 is that new entrants have very low returns, even after 
taking account the benefit of owning and lending or the cost of shorting.  In other words, 
frictions cannot explain why anyone is willing to own these stocks, nor why short sellers do not 
continue to pay the shorting costs, sell and drive the price down further.  This result is important 
because it shows that direct financial shorting costs cannot fully explain the overpricing.   
Unwillingness to short or other costs that are not captured in the loan rate must play a role; 
otherwise it is hard to see why one should be able to earn excess returns of one to two percent a 
month using publicly available information.  Some type of generic short sale constraint is 
preventing arbitrageurs from driving down prices enough.   
5.4.  Monthly portfolio returns 
In Table 8 we examine monthly portfolio returns from implementing the new entrant 
strategy.  We form portfolios that buy stocks that have been added to the loan rate list in the past 
12 months, and short these stocks’ corresponding size portfolios.  Since new entrants come in 
waves there are numerous months with no new additions.  We discard months in which there 
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sample. 
Column (1) of panel A shows results from an equal-weighted portfolio of new entrants.  
The mean monthly return is large and significant at -1.28 (about what one would expect from 
Table 5).  The median return (taking the median within the month instead of the mean) is also 
-1.28, showing outliers are not an issue.  Next we add the three factors of Fama and French 
(1993): RMRF (the value-weighted market return minus t-bill returns), SMB (small minus big, 
returns on small stocks minus returns on big stocks) and HML (high minus low, returns on high 
book-market stocks minus returns on low book-market stocks), all available starting in July 1926 
from Davis, Fama, and French (2000).  Risk-adjusting in this way has little effect on the mean 
return, and the intercept term is still large and significant.  Thus it appears that the loan crowd 
entrant effect is statistically distinct from the size and value effects.  
Columns (3) and (4) use value-weighted portfolio returns.  Although here again the three 
factor model has little effect, compared to equal-weighted the average returns are about half as 
big.  Evidently the effect is concentrated in smaller stocks.  One possible explanation is that the 
other risks and costs of short selling are concentrated in smaller stocks that may be more difficult 
to short. 
Panel B addresses the question of whether the low returns are fully accounted for by the 
short selling costs.  As before, the answer is no.  In column (1), again we cost-adjust the returns 
by adding the cost of shorting to the portfolio return, and again this variable can be interpreted as 
the benefit of owning the stock and lending it to short sellers.  Comparing the first columns of 
Panels A and B, less than half of the negative returns can be explained by short selling costs.  
Cost-adjusted returns are large at -0.69 percent per month, although the t-statistic on this 
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The rest of panel B examines the value effect.  In column (2) we show the mean return on 
the value factor during our sample, from Davis, Fama, and French (2000).  The fact that 
(controlling for size) higher market-book stocks are more expensive to short has potentially 
important implications for the value effect.  We address this issue in our sample of stocks by 
calculating a proxy for HML using only loan crowd stocks.  We form an equal weighted 
portfolio of loan crowd stocks in the top half of all CRSP stocks sorted on book-market, and 
subtract returns from the loan crowd stocks in the bottom half.  This proxy, which we call HC - 
LC (for high book-market and loan crowd minus low book-market and loan crowd), is quite 
successful at matching the properties of HML given the limitations of the sample.  It has a 
monthly correlation of 0.75 with HML, and as shown in columns (2) and (3) it closely 
reproduces the mean return on HML in this period (which happens to be about the same as the 
average HML of 0.46 reported by Davis, Fama, and French (2000) for the entire period 1929-
1997).  Although our sample does not include many stocks (such as small stocks) that may be 
impossible or very costly to short, it is notable that the value effect is still present in stocks that 
we know are shortable.  Thus inability to short cannot be responsible for the value effect in our 
sample. 
HML and HC - LC can be interpreted as the return one would get from owning value 
stocks and shorting growth stocks.  As is traditional, the returns in columns (2) and (3) are 
calculated only using prices and dividends and ignoring the costs of shorting or the benefit of 
lending.  Column (4) shows the effect of subtracting shorting costs from the returns earned by 
the short end of the strategy, namely shorting growth stocks.  It shows that accounting for the 
costs of shorting during this period, the average profits on the value strategy are completely 
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lending.  The effects of symmetrically adding the cost of shorting to the long side of the strategy, 
as well as subtracting from the short side, are shown in column (5).  Column (5) shows that 
differences in shorting costs completely fail to explain the value effect, as the added component 
of returns is about the same for both the long and short portfolios.  Thus like Geczy et al (2001), 
we find it does not appear that shorting costs could plausibly explain the value effect in our 
sample.   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we assemble a dataset on stock loan rates for a number of NYSE stocks 
over an eight year period.  These loan rates represent the direct monetary costs of shorting a 
particular stock.  They also reveal which stocks are in demand by short sellers.  While we do not 
know the precise algorithm that determines when demand is high enough to warrant trading the 
stock at the loan post or why these additions tend to all occur on a single day, the valuable 
information lies in which stocks out of the universe of potential additions are selected.  
We find that stocks that are expensive to short have high market-book ratios, compared to 
times when these stocks are cheaper to short.  However, we find that the value effect does not 
appear to be easily explainable using shorting costs.  Stocks that are expensive to short have low 
subsequent returns, consistent with the hypothesis that they are overpriced.  However, these 
expensive to short stocks tend also to be small, and after accounting for size the evidence for this 
return effect is statistically weak. 
Stocks that have high shorting demand, as indicated by their addition to the stock loan 
list, have low returns, and this effect is statistically strong and robust.  The economic magnitude 
of the effect is large.  In the period 1926-1933, loan crowd entrants have average returns that are 
 33 one to two percent per month lower than other stocks of similar size.  These stocks appear 
overpriced.  Looking at the time pattern of market-book ratios and returns, stocks have positive 
returns and rising valuations prior to being added to the list.  Their market-book ratios peak when 
they are added to the list, and the excess returns thereafter are negative.  These low returns 
exceed the costs of shorting, so that it appears possible for arbitrageurs to earn high returns after 
costs from shorting these overpriced stocks.  Put another way, a rational investor would not be 
willing to buy these stocks since they would not generate sufficiently high income from lending 
the stock out.  Thus, in addition to the shorting costs that we observe, there must be some other 
short sale constraint which allows these stocks to become overpriced.   
Even if the magnitude of the returns was quantitatively equal to the shorting costs, in 
equilibrium all shares must be held by some investor who is not lending them out.  Thus some 
investors were voluntarily buying stocks with extremely low subsequent returns, despite the fact 
that the high shorting costs were publicly observable in the Wall Street Journal, and high 
shorting demand might be inferred by the first appearance of these stocks in the Wall Street 
Journal’s list.  Why these investors were willing to buy these overpriced stocks is a mystery.  It 
may be that these investors had some special reason to buy these stocks, a reason not shared by 
other investors.  This reason might be some tax implication, institutional constraint, hedging 
demand, cognitive error, difference of opinion, or unusual preference. 
Overall, though, the evidence is consistent with stories like Pontiff (1996) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) in which there are limits to arbitrage.  Specifically, some stocks could 
become overpriced.  A subset of investors recognizes and shorts these overpriced stocks.   
Because the shorting market is imperfect, this subset of investors affects prices in the shorting 
market, making these stocks expensive to short and driving them onto the loan crowd.   
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 35 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Duffie (1996) develops a model along these lines that examines the impact of lending 
fees on a security’s price, focusing on the US Treasury market.  His main result is that lending 
fees will be capitalized into a security’s price.  Jordan and Jordan (1997) and Krishnamurthy 
(2001) provide empirical evidence from the US Treasury market that is broadly consistent with 
these implications. 
2 Stock lending between institutions is economically almost identical to the securitized 
borrowing and lending that takes place in the fixed income market via repurchase agreements or 
“repos”.  The repo rate corresponds to the rebate as the variable that equilibrates supply and 
demand in the borrowing market.   
3 Both call money and loan rates are closing prices as of the last day of the month.  
However, there is a slight mismatch in our observations of call loan rates since they are only 
available on weekdays.  In contrast, the NYSE was open on Saturday during this period.  The 
January 1926 observations on loan rates (as well as CRSP prices) come from Saturday January 
30 1926, whereas the call money rate comes from Friday January 29. 
4 Book value for stocks with fiscal years ending in year N are assigned to year N+1 (we 
also drop negative book values).  Thus book value is at least one month stale; book value for 
year N is first reflected in market-book in January of year N+1. 
5 Short interest is available for a subset of loan crowd stocks from Macaulay and Durand 
(1951) and Meeker (1932).   
6 The reason that the fraction of stocks in the top and bottom halves is not exactly 50 is 
the frequency of ties.  In the 1930-33 sample, the maximum loan rate is a rate of exactly zero, so 
that 89 percent of the sample with a zero loan rate is the bottom half of the cost distribution 
 36                                                                                                                                                              
(except for one month). 
7 We used only stocks with a price greater than $5 a share, and required that there be at 
least 20 such stocks in the decile portfolio (many small stocks had prices of less than $5 a share 
in the early 1930’s). 
8 The following additional robustness checks to Table 5 do not substantially change the 
NEWQ1 coefficient in column (3): replacing size adjusting with industry adjusting using two-
digit SIC codes, splitting the sample into before or after the crash of October 1929, splitting the 
sample into months in which market returns were positive or nonpositive, or discarding size-
adjusted returns with absolute value greater than 50.   For column (5), adding fixed stock effects 
does not change the results. 
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 39 Table 1 
Stock Loan Rates, January and February 1926 
 
 Jan  26 Feb 26 Jan  26 Feb 26
AMERICAN BRAKE SHOE     -54  GENERAL MOTORS CORP  3.5  4 
AMERICAN BROWN BOVERI     0  GIMBEL BROS INC    0 
AMERICAN CAN CO  4.5  5  JONES BROTHERS TEA CO    0 
AMERICAN SMLT & REFNG  4.5  5  JORDAN MTR CAR INC    0 
AMERICAN SUGAR REFNG   0  0  LEHIGH VALLEY RR CO  3.5  4 
AMERICAN TOB CO    0  MISSOURI PAC RR CO  3.5  4 
AMERICAN WOOLEN CO  0  0  NATIONAL CLOAK & SUIT     0 
ANACONDA COPPER MNG   4.5  0  NATIONAL LEAD CO  0  0 
ARMOUR & CO    0  NEW YORK CENT RR CO  3.5  4 
ATCHISON TOPEKA & SANTA FE  3.5  4  NY NH  & HARTFORD RR  3.5  4 
BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE   3.5  4  NORTHERN PACIFIC RY   3.5  4 
BALTIMORE & OHIO RR CO  3.5  4  PAN AMERICAN PETROL   3.5  4 
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP  3.5  4  PENNSYLVANIA RR  0  0 
BROOKLYN MANHATTAN TRAN  3.5  4  READING COMPANY  3.5  4 
CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RY   3.5  4  SAVAGE ARMS CORP     -26 
CHICAGO & EASTN ILL RY     -67  SIMMONS COMPANY    0 
CHICAGO MILW & ST PAUL   3.5  4  SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO  3.5  4 
CHICAGO ROCK IS & PAC   3.5  4  SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO  3.5  4 
CHRYSLER CORP  4.5  5  STANDARD OIL CO CALIF    0 
COCA COLA CO  3.5  4  STUDEBAKER CORP NJ  4.5  5 
CONTINENTAL CAN INC  3.5  4  UNION PACIFIC RR  3.5  4 
CRUCIBLE STL CO AMER  0  2  UNITED DRUG CO    0 
CUBA CANE SUGAR CORP    0  UNITED FRUIT CO  0  0 
CUYAMEL FRUIT CO    0  UNITED STATES STEEL   4.5  5 
DAVISON CHEM CO  4.5  5  U S INDL ALCOHOL   3.5  4 
DELAWARE & HUDSON CO  0  0  UNITED STS RUBR CO  4.5  5 
DEVOE & RAYNOLDS CO    0  VIRGINIA CAROLINA    -14 
ERIE RR CO  3.5  4  WEBER & HEILBRONER  0  0 
FAMOUS PLAYERS LASKY   3.5  4  WESTERN UN TELEG CO  0  0 
FOUNDATION CO    0        
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Stock loan rates, 1925-1933 
 
Properties of loan rates for 8,310 monthly observations.  COST is the monthly percent cost of 
shorting, defined as the call money rate minus the loan rate, divided by 12.  ME is market value 
of equity.  M/B is market-to-book.  D/P is the dividend yield, defined as total dividend per share 
payments over the last twelve months divided by the current price (adjusted for splits).  Rt-1,t-12 is 
total stock return from month t-12 to month t-1, in percent.  The sample runs from December 
1925 to July 1933.  The 1925-30 sample is December 1925 to September 1930.  The 1930-33 
sample is October 1930 to July 1933.  COSTRANK is the percentile of the cost among loan 
crowd stocks in that month.  SIZERANK is the percentile of market equity among all CRSP 
stocks in that month.  MBRANK is the percentile of ME/BE among all CRSP stocks in that 
month.  RETURNRANK is the percentile of Rt-1,t-12 among all CRSP stocks in that month.   
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 
 1925-30 1930-33 1925-1933 
              
 Fraction Fraction Fraction COST ln(ME) ln(M/B)  D/P  Rt-1,t-12 
All loan crowd stocks        0.35 10.89 -0.11  5.57 0.77
  Top half ranked on cost  0.47  0.12  0.30  0.87 10.33 -0.04  4.41 2.26
  Bottom half ranked on cost  0.53  0.88  0.70  0.12 11.13 -0.15  6.02 0.21
             
By loaning rate                 
  Positive  0.61  0.01  0.32  0.12 11.87  0.43  4.23 19.10
  Zero (flat)  0.37  0.89  0.62  0.24 10.38 -0.34  5.99 -5.82
  Negative (premium)  0.02  0.10  0.06  2.69 10.89 -0.23  7.76 -18.22
             
Stocks not in loan crowd         9.10  -0.44  4.89 -0.44
              
Only months in which stocks are added to loan crowd list:         
  Stocks appearing for the first time      1.91 10.56 0.14 6.88 -8.58
  All other loan crowd stocks        0.35 10.75 -0.31 6.26 -14.17
 
 
Panel B. Correlations with COSTRANK 
 SIZERANK  MBRANK  RETURNRANK 
      
1926-33 -0.37  -0.10  -0.04 
1926-30 -0.55  -0.19  -0.12 
1930-33 0.08  0.09  0.09 
 41 Table 3 
Transition probabilities 
 
For stocks that have reported loaning rates in either month t-1 or month t.  The “Ever positive” 
and “always zero” columns are for stocks with at least 6 previous observations and use data 
going back to 1919:12.  The sample runs from December 1925 to July 1933.  The 1925-1930 
sample is December 1925 to September 1930.  The 1930-1933 sample is October 1930 to July 
1933.   
 
  Loan rate in previous month  In all previous months
 







        
1925-1933        
N  2678  5145 487  167 5352  1089 
        
Positive  0.93 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.46 0.03 
Zero  0.06 0.94 0.38 0.46 0.49 0.95 
Premium  0.00 0.03 0.57 0.33 0.04 0.01 
Not  in  loan  crowd  0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 
        
1925-1930        
N  2619  1595 91  85 2910  652 
        
Positive  0.95 0.03 0.00 0.42 0.83 0.04 
Zero  0.04 0.94 0.13 0.44 0.15 0.94 
Premium  0.00 0.01 0.81 0.14 0.01 0.00 
Not  in  loan  crowd  0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 
        
1930-1933        
N  59 3550  396  82 2442  437 
        
Positive  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Zero  1.00 0.94 0.44 0.48 0.90 0.96 
Premium  0.00 0.04 0.51 0.52 0.08 0.01 
Not  in  loan  crowd  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 
        
 
 42 Table 4 
Market-book ratios and loan rate status 1926-1933 
 
OLS regressions where ln(ME/BE) is the dependent variable.  The sample for columns (1) - (3) is all loan 
crowd stocks.  The sample for columns (4) - (6) includes stocks that are not in the loan crowd in month t 
but have been or will be in other months.  NEWQ1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the stock first 
appeared on the loan crowd list this quarter, i.e. in months t-2 to t.  NEWQ(-2) to NEWQ4 are defined 
similarly.  AFTERQ4 is for stocks that were on the loan crowd list before month t-12.  COSTRANK is 
the percentile of the cost among loan crowd stocks in that month, unless the stock is not loaned in the loan 
crowd in which case it is zero.  The sample is restricted to stocks with share price greater than $5.  All 
regressions include calendar date dummies, with standard errors (in parentheses) that take into account 
clustering by date. The sample runs from December 1925 to July 1933.   
 
  (1)    (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sample  Loan crowd currently  Loan crowd ever 
Period  1926-1933  1926-1933 1926-1933 1926-1933 1926-1930  1930-1933
             
ln(ME) 
   
0.34 
(0.01)     
COSTRANK -0.49 















































































             
N 4817    4817  4817  10939  6828  4111 
R
2  0.17  0.18  0.44  0.84  0.85  0.90 
Stock specific 
dummies  N    N N Y  Y  Y 
 43 Table 5 
The relation between loan rate status and returns 
 
OLS regression of returns in month t+1 on loan status in month t.  The sample for columns (1) - (4) is all 
loan crowd stocks.  The sample for column (5) includes stocks that are not loan crowd in month t but have 
been or will be in other months.  In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is raw returns, R.  In 
columns (3) - (5) the dependent variable is size-adjusted returns, R - RSIZE, where RSIZE is the value 
weighted return on the portfolio of all CRSP stocks (not in loan crowd) in the same market capitalization 
decile as the loan crowd stock in month t.  NEWQ1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the stock is on the 
loan list and first appeared this quarter, i.e. in months t-2 to t.  NEWQ(-2) to NEWQ4 are defined 
similarly.  AFTERQ4 is one for stocks that were on the loan crowd list before month t-12.  COSTRANK 
is the percentile of the cost among loan crowd stocks in that month, unless the stock is not loaned in the 
loan crowd in which case it is zero.  The sample is restricted to stocks with share price greater than $5 in 
month t and when size-adjusting returns we require the portfolio to contain at least 20 stocks.  All 
regressions include calendar date dummies, with standard errors (in parentheses) that take into account 
clustering by date. The loan rate sample runs from December 1925 to July 1933.   
 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)   (5) 
LHS Var.  R  R – RSIZE 












































            
-0.55 
(0.56) 
              
R
2 0.58    0.58  0.10  0.10    0.04 
N 7828    7828  7398  7398    16564 
 44 Table 6 
Robustness checks on the relation between loan rate status and returns 
 
OLS regression of percent returns in month t+1 on variables in month t.  The sample is all loan 
crowd stocks. In columns (1) - (3) the dependent variable is returns adjusted for size (R-RSIZE) 
and in column (4) the dependent variable is returns adjusted for size and market-book 
(R-RMATCH).  R is raw returns in percent.  RSIZE is the value weighted return on the portfolio 
of all CRSP stocks (not in loan crowd) in the same market capitalization decile in month t.  
RMATCH is the value weighted return on the portfolio of all CRSP stocks (not in loan crowd) 
that were in the same market capitalization tercile and the same market-book tercile in month t.  
NEWQ1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the stock is on the loan list and first appeared this 
quarter, i.e. in months t-2 to t.  COSTRANK is the percentile of the cost among loan crowd 
stocks in that month.  ME is market value of equity.  BE is book equity.  The sample is restricted 
to stocks with share price greater than $5 in month t and when adjusting by size or market-book 
we require the matching portfolio to contain at least 20 stocks.  All regressions include calendar 
date dummies, with standard errors (in parentheses) that take into account clustering by date. The 
loan rate sample runs from December 1925 to July 1933.  The 1926-30 sample is December 
1925 to September 1930.  The 1930-33 sample is October 1930 to July 1933.   
 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) 
LHS Variable  R – RSIZE    R – RMATCH 
Sample 1926-1930  1930-1933  1926-1933    1926-1933 





























   
NEWQ1*ln(ME/BE) 
    
-0.46 
(1.39)    
          
R
2 0.03  0.13  0.09    0.11 
N 4240  3158  4555    4364 
 
 45 Table 7 
Returns after costs 
 
OLS regression of percent returns in month t+1 on loan status in month t.  The sample is all loan 
crowd stocks.  R is raw returns in percent.  In columns (1) - (3) the dependent variable is size-
adjusted returns plus the cost of shorting (R-RSIZE+COST).  In columns (4) - (5) the dependent 
variable is size-adjusted returns (R-RSIZE).  RSIZE is the value weighted return on the portfolio 
of all CRSP stocks (not in loan crowd) in the same market capitalization decile in month t.   
COST is the monthly percent cost of shorting, defined as the call money rate minus the loan rate, 
divided by 12.  NEWQ1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the stock is on the loan list and first 
appeared this quarter, i.e. in months t-2 to t.  PREMIUM is a dummy variable equal to one for 
premium stocks.  The sample is restricted to stocks with share price greater than $5 in month t 
and when adjusting by size we require the matching portfolio to contain at least 20 stocks.  All 
regressions include calendar date dummies, with standard errors (in parentheses) that take into 
account clustering by date. The loan rate sample runs from December 1925 to July 1933.  The 
1926-1930 sample is December 1925 to September 1930.  The 1930-1933 sample is October 
1930 to July 1933.   
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
LHS Variable  R – RSIZE + COST  R – RSIZE 
Sample 1926-1933  1926-1930 1930-1933  1926-1933 1926-1933 






























     
-0.10 
(1.22) 
         
R
2  0.10 0.03 0.13  0.10  0.10 
N  7398 4240 3158  7398 7398 
 
 46 Table 8 
Monthly portfolio returns 
 
Monthly portfolio regression results for returns from January 1926 to August 1933.  Panel A shows mean returns and three factor 
results for a portfolio of new entrants to the loan crowd.  NEWEW is the equal-weighted size-adjusted return for all stocks newly 
appearing on the loan list in the past 12 months, provided 5 such stocks exist in month t. NEWVW is similarly defined but value-
weighted.  RMRF, SMB, and HML are market, size, and value factors constructed by Davis, Fama, and French (2000) and available 
starting July 1926.  Panel B shows mean returns for new entrants after adjusting for shorting costs, and shows mean return for value 
portfolios with and without adjusting for shorting costs.  HC – LC is a proxy for HML for loan crowd stocks, constructed using HC 
and LC.  HC is high book-market and loan crowd, the equal weighted return on a portfolio of loan crowd stocks in the bottom 50 % of 
market-book in the CRSP universe.  LC is low book-market and loan crowd, the equal weighted return on a portfolio of loan crowd 
stocks in the top 50% of market-book in the CRSP universe.  COSTi is the monthly percent cost of shorting portfolio i.   
 
Panel A. Three factor regressions 
    (1)       
     
       
       
       
       
       
        
            















































2 0.00   0.16   0.00   0.11
#  of  months 61 57 61 57
 
 47 Table 8 
Panel B.  Mean returns 
 
          (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)
  Plus lending benefit  Traditional returns  Minus shorting cost  Minus shorting cost plus lending benefit 
Variable:        NEWEW + COSTNEW HML HC–LC
 
HC + COSTHC – LC  HC + COSTHC – LC – COSTLC 














months 61 86 86 86 86
    
           
 48 Figure 1 







































































































Percent nonpositive Percent negative (premium) Dow Jones Industrial Average
The fraction of rated stocks that have nonpositive or premium loan rates and the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  The loan 
rate variables are end of month; the Dow variable is the monthly average of daily levels. 
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Call money rate  High loan rate
 50 Figure 3 
 














































































































































































































Total number of stocks Number of stocks at premium
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Total short interest Extrapolated short interest DJIA
 52 Figure 5 










































































































































































































































































































Value weighted cost of shorting Short interest for rated firms Extrapolated short interest
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